

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC  
DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

NO: 500-06-001010-194

(Class Action)  
SUPERIOR COURT

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**M. ROYER**

and

**A. ABOU-KHADRA**

*Petitioners*

-vs.-

**CAPITAL ONE BANK (CANADA BRANCH)**  
and  
**CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION**

and

**CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION**, legal person duly constituted, having its head office at 1680 Capital One Drive, City of McLean, State of Virginia, 22102, U.S.A.

and

**AMAZON.COM.CA, INC.**, legal person duly constituted, having its head office at 410 Terry Avenue North, City of Seattle, State of Washington, 98109, U.S.A.

and

**AMAZON.COM, INC.**, legal person duly constituted, having its head office at 410 Terry Avenue North, City of Seattle, State of Washington, 98109, U.S.A.

and

**AMAZON WEB SERVICES CANADA, INC.**, legal person duly constituted, having its head office at 800-885 West Georgia Street, City of Vancouver, Province of British Columbia, V6C 3H1

and

AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., legal person duly constituted, having its head office at 410 Terry Ave. North, City of Seattle, State of Washington, 98109, U.S.A.

and

AMAZON TECHNOLOGIES, INC., legal person duly constituted, legal person duly constituted, having its head office at 410 Terry Avenue North, City of Seattle, State of Washington, 98109, U.S.A.

*Respondents*

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**AMENDED APPLICATION TO AUTHORIZE THE BRINGING OF A CLASS ACTION  
& TO APPOINT THE PETITIONERS AS REPRESENTATIVES**  
**(Art. 574 C.C.P. and following)**

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TO ONE OF THE HONOURABLE JUSTICES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, SITTING IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTREAL, YOUR PETITIONERS STATE AS FOLLOWS:

## **VI. GENERAL PRESENTATION**

### **A) The Action**

1. Petitioners wish to institute a class action on behalf of the following group, of which they are members, namely:
  - all persons, entities, or organizations resident in Quebec who were either Capital One Credit Card holders or who had applied for a Capital One Credit Card and whose personal and private information was compromised by the incident that occurred on or about March 22 and 23, 2019 (though such breach was only disclosed to the public on July 29, 2019), or any other group to be determined by the Court;
2. This is a case of negligence, whereby the Respondents, through their failure to adequately protect and safeguard Class Members' personal and private information (including by properly encrypting sensitive data), have compromised their clients' personal and private information by allowing for unauthorized access by an outside individual;
3. Further, this is a case of a delayed notice to Class Members, as the theft occurred on March 22 and 23, 2019, was apparently discovered on July 17, 2019, was confirmed on July 19, 2019, and was only disclosed to the public on July 29, 2019;
- 3.1 This case involves one of the biggest data security breaches in history. As will be more fully described herein, the data theft occurred when a former employee of Respondent Amazon Web Services, Inc. (Paige Thompson) obtained unauthorized access to the personal and private information of Class Members. She was thereafter captured by the FBI and indicted;
- 3.2 As information came to light regarding the nature of the attack, a striking set of facts began to emerge – not about the attacker herself – but about Capital One and Amazon who had together, over several years, orchestrated a massive migration of highly-sensitive data from Capital One's private cloud to a public cloud<sup>1</sup> (AWS cloud) under the cover of misleading statements and security software that Capital One and Amazon jointly created and jointly marketed to customers, regulators, and to the public as a means of keeping the data safe;

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<sup>1</sup> A private cloud consists of computing resources dedicated exclusively to the customer. Capital One had historically placed its data on company-owned servers. Public clouds are computing resources maintained by a third party, not dedicated to any particular customer, in which any given customer simply leases space. The most prominent public cloud, which Capital One and millions of other customers employed, is Amazon Web Services (AWS).

3.3 Class Members entrusted their most sensitive data – data that could be used by a miscreant to assume those customers’ identities – to a bank and a cloud computing company based on their reasonable belief that it would be safe and secure. Capital One and Amazon thoroughly monetized (and continue to monetize) sensitive Capital One customer data, mining it for every edge and insight about their behaviours;

3.4 This case is about Capital One and Amazon’s conduct—not the data theft that revealed it. In order to obtain customer data and the lucrative interest and fees those customers generated, both Capital One and Amazon promised customers that their data was safe and protected in Amazon’s AWS public cloud for storage and processing of sensitive financial data (“AWS”). These assurances have now been shown to be indisputably false and/or misleading—and they continue to be so;

3.5 As a result of the Respondents’ false and/or misleading representations regarding the safety of the data under its control and/or in its possession, Class Members have paid billions of dollars in interest and fees to Capital One that they never would have paid had they known the truth: that their sensitive personal and private data was being pooled in a giant “data lake” on the world’s most notoriously insecure public cloud, examined by machine learning tools while at risk of theft via a well-known, unfixed Server Side Request Forgery (“SSRF”)<sup>2</sup> attack vector;

4. It is estimated that approximately 100 million persons were affected in the U.S. and approximately 6 million persons in Canada. With respect to Canadians, approximately 1 million social insurance numbers (“SIN”) were compromised in the incident;

5. In addition to SIN numbers, it is believed at this time that the data breach affects the following sensitive information that was collected at the time that the individuals and small businesses applied for a Capital One Credit Card between 2005 and 2019 including, but not limited to: names, addresses, zip codes/postal codes, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, self-reported income, credit card application data, portions of credit card customer data, including, customer status data, e.g., credit scores, credit limits, balances, payment history, contact information, fragments of transaction data from a total of 23 days during 2016, 2017 and 2018, the whole as appears more fully from a press release issued by the Capital One Respondents on July 29, 2019 entitled “Capital One Announces Data Security Incident” and from a copy of extracts from the Capital One Respondents’ website at [www.capitalone.com](http://www.capitalone.com), produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-1**;

<sup>2</sup> In a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack, the attacker can abuse functionality on the server to read or update internal resources. The attacker can supply or a modify a URL which the code running on the server will read or submit data to, and by carefully selecting the URLs, the attacker may be able to read server configuration such as AWS metadata, connect to internal services like http enabled databases or perform post requests towards internal services which are not intended to be exposed.

5.1 Unbelievably, the precise conditions created by the Respondents that gave rise to the March data theft persist to this day. The Respondents continue to aggregate and mine customer data under the same unsafe conditions that existed in March of 2019. Years of customer data is even today being aggregated and shared across hundreds of data mining systems, a simple SSRF attack away from another massive theft. This unsafe aggregation of data is not a virus, it is a feature. It is one way that Capital One makes money, and it is how Amazon sells its cloud computing services. Without years' worth of aggregated customer data, both companies would lose a competitive advantage;

5.2 The Respondents know that there is no fix. They know that there is no setting they can change, or software that they can write, to eliminate the risks that they knowingly put on their customers;

6. By reason of the Respondents' failure to safeguard their customers' personal and private information, Petitioners and Members of the Class have suffered damages and are entitled to claim *inter alia*: (a) trouble and inconvenience by having to carefully review their transactions and be on the lookout for fraud, (b) the lost value of their personal and private information, which they were unaware was subject to unlawful access and use (...), (c) inflated prices for Capital One' services, (d) any additional credit monitoring services not already covered by the Respondents, (e) possible future fraud, (f) stress and anxiety, and (g) punitive damages;

## **B) The Respondents**

(i) The Capital One Respondents

7. Respondent Capital One Financial Corporation ("Capital One U.S.") is a publicly-traded financial services company under the laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A. Capital One U.S. issues MasterCard-branded credit cards throughout Canada, including within the province of Quebec. It is the registrant of the trade-marks "CAPITAL ONE" (TMA469123) and "CAPITAL ONE" (TMA469182), which were both filed on September 25, 1995, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the trade-marks from the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), produced herein en liasse as Exhibit R-2;

8. Credit is extended through Respondent Capital One Bank (Canada Branch) ("Capital One Canada"), which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Capital One U.S. and which operates throughout Canada, including within the province of Quebec, as the Canadian branch of Respondent Capital One Bank (USA), National Association the whole as appears more fully from a copy of an extract from the Registre des entreprises, produced herein as Exhibit R-3;

8.1 Respondent Capital One Bank (USA), National Association ("COBNA") is a financial services company, which offers credit and debit card products, other lending

products and deposit products. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Respondent Capital One U.S. that has the authority to operate as an authorized foreign bank pursuant to the Bank Act and to conduct its credit card business of providing credit card loans in Canada through its Canadian branch, Respondent Capital One Canada (Exhibit R-10);

9. The most popular of the Capital One Respondents' products are those credit cards used to cardholders for use by customers of Costco, Hudson's Bay, and Saks;

(ii) The Amazon Respondents

9.1 Respondent Amazon.com.ca, Inc. ("Amazon.com.ca") is an American electronic commerce corporation and cloud computing provider, with its head office in Seattle, Washington. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Respondent Amazon.com, Inc.;

9.2 Respondent Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon.com") is an American electronic commerce corporation and cloud computing provider, with its head office in Seattle, Washington. It is the parent company under which all of the other Amazon Respondents operate;

9.3 Respondent Amazon Web Services Canada, Inc. ("AWS Canada") is a Canadian electronic commerce corporation and cloud computing provider that maintains large data centres throughout the country, with its head office in Vancouver, British Columbia. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AWSHC, Inc. which operates throughout Canada, including within the province of Quebec. It was incorporated on July 24, 2014, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of an extract from the *Registre des entreprises* and from a copy of an extract from Corporation Canada, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-4**;

9.4 Respondent Amazon Web Services, Inc. is an American corporation that maintains data centres in North America;

9.5 Respondent Amazon Technologies, Inc. ("Amazon Technologies") is an American electronic commerce corporation and cloud computing provider, with its head office in Seattle, Washington. It is the applicant of the trade-marks "AWS" (Application Number 1856434), which was filed on September 7, 2017, "AMAZON WEB SERVICES" (Application Number 1856435), which was filed on September 7, 2017, "AWS" (Application Number 1918922), which was filed on September 7, 2018, and "AWS IS HOW" (Application Number 1953783), which was filed on March 26, 2019, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the trade-marks from the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-5**;

9.6 Amazon Web Services (AWS) has been available within Canada for years before launching its two "Availability Zones" in December 2016, made up of one or more data centres in Montreal, Quebec and in Toronto, Ontario. This meant that the tens

of thousands of Canadians who were using other AWS regions could not use the AWS Cloud to store their data on infrastructure in Canada, the whole as appears more fully from a copies of extracts from the Amazon Respondents' website at <http://aws.amazon.com>, from a copy of the IT World article entitled "Amazon Web Services now offers local Canadian region availability" dated December 8, 2016, from a copy of the Data Center Knowledge article entitled "AWS Heads North, Launches Central Canada Cloud Region" dated December 9, 2016, and from a copy of the Amazon Web Services, Inc. press release entitled "Amazon Web Services Cloud Now Available to Customers from Data Centers in Canada" dated December 8, 2016, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-6**;

10. Given the close ties between the Capital One Respondents and the Amazon Respondents and considering the preceding, they are all solidarity liable for the acts and omissions of the other;

### C) The Situation



- (i) Capital One Credit Cards and Capital One's Data Collection Practices

10.1 Capital One is one of the largest credit card issuers in North America; its Canadian offices are located in Toronto, Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario and in Montreal, Quebec;

10.2 Capital One has offered Canadians a range of Mastercard credit cards since 1996. Capital One offers Canadian customers various Capital One Mastercard credit card products including a cash-back card for Costco Wholesale members (since 2015), the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the BNN Bloomberg article entitled "6M hacked, 1M SINS exposed: How big is Capital One in Canada?" dated July 30, 2019 and from a copy of an extract from the Capital One Respondents' website at [www.capitalone.ca](http://www.capitalone.ca), produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-7**;

10.3 There are six different types of Capital One credit cards (Exhibit R-7):

1. The Guaranteed Mastercard®

2. The Low Rate Guaranteed Mastercard®
  3. The Guaranteed Secured Mastercard®
  4. The Aspire Travel™ Platinum Mastercard®
  5. The Aspire Cash™ Platinum Mastercard®
  6. The Capital One Mastercard®, Exclusively for Costco Members
- (ii) Capital One's Data Collection Practices

10.4 When consumers apply for a credit card and other financial products and services, Capital One requires them to provide personal and private information, including their full name, date of birth, social security number (optional today), address, email address, phone number, employment status, financial information such as annual income, and other valuable, confidential, personal, and private information. Capital One collects and stores this information alongside with additional personal and private information relating to consumers, including payment and transaction history, account balances, credit limits, and credit scores, the whole as appears more fully from copies of extracts from the Capital One Respondents' website at <https://creditapp.capitalone.ca>, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-8**;

#### Personal Information

First Name	Last Name	
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	
Date of Birth	Mother's Maiden Name <span>?</span>	
<input type="text" value="MM/DD/YYYY"/>	<input type="text"/>	
Social Insurance Number <span>🔒</span> (Optional) <span>?</span>	How did you learn about this card? (Optional)	
<input type="text" value="___-___-___"/>	<input type="text" value="Select source"/>	

## Contact Information

Street Address	Suite/Apt. # (if Applicable)	
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	
City	Province	Postal Code
<input type="text"/>	Select province <span>▼</span>	<input type="text"/>
Email Address <span>?</span>	Primary Phone Number	
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	

## Authorized User ?

- Yes!** I would like to add an Authorized User (AU) to my account and receive a second card with their name on it. (If you're adding an AU, please provide us with their information.)

## Employment Information

Employment Status

Select status ▼

## Financial Information

Do you: (Optional)

Own  Rent  Live with parents  Other

Your Annual Income (Before Taxes)	Other Household Income (Before Taxes) <span>?</span>
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Do you have a mortgage? (Optional)	Monthly Rent/Mortgage (Optional)
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	<input type="text"/>
Do you have any bank accounts?	Would you like to use your card for cash advances? (Optional)
Select a type <span>▼</span>	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No

10.5 This personal and private information isn't just received and stored, its used to gather even more sensitive information on credit card applicants, including data from credit bureaus. Before issuing a credit card to an applicant, issuers (like Capital One) run what is called a "credit check" through one or more credit bureaus who then issues them a credit report, which is used by Capital One to form a credit history, which is used to determine how much to lend (i.e. credit limit) to an applicant, at what interest rate, and what fees to charge for the use of the credit card;

10.6 In short, credit card issuers like Capital One use applicants' sensitive personal and private information to make money. The more personal information a credit card issuer has about its applicants, the more precisely it can target credit risk (and shore up its bottom line) through higher interest rates, low credit limits, and miscellaneous fees;

10.7 Capital One is the best in the business at making money from granularly-targeted fees and interest. Indeed, it is this ability to target people by risk level that has allowed Capital One to profit from the riskiest borrowers. In the past decade, Capital One's credit card business has repeatedly been fined by federal and state regulators for unlawfully aggressive sales and monetization tactics. Between July 2011 and March 1, 2017, the United States Consumer Finance Protection Bureau ("CFPB") received more than 12,000 complaints directed toward Capital One's credit cards:

TABLE 6: MOST-COMPLAINED-ABOUT COMPANIES FOR CREDIT CARD<sup>10</sup>

Company	3 month average: Oct - Dec 2016	% change vs. 3 month period last year	3 month average % untimely: Oct - Dec 2016	Total Credit card complaints
Citibank	372.0	32%	0.1%	15,542
Capital One	218.7	18%	0%	12,074
JPMorgan Chase	210.0	30%	0%	9,614
Synchrony Financial	187.3	18%	0%	8,044
Bank of America	148.3	9%	0%	8,518
Amex	146.7	41%	0%	6,120
Wells Fargo	113.3	99%	41%	3,738
Barclays PLC	91.0	28%	0%	3,163
Discover	88.3	6%	0%	3,902
U.S. Bancorp	55.3	35%	0%	2,238
TD Bank US Holding Company	32.3	24%	0%	1,182

The whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Monthly Complaint Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau dated March 2017, produced herein as **Exhibit R-9**;

10.8 User-targeted fees and interest are only part of the story. In recent years, credit card issuers such as Capital One have developed an even more broadly sweeping way to make money from users' personal and private information: rewards programs. Specifically, card issuers like Capital One use rewards programs to maximize revenue from interchange fees (described below), and they use the

personal information of applicants and cardholders to optimally target and shape these rewards programs;

10.9 Credit card companies make money not only from fees and interest paid by their cardholders, but also from processing fees paid by merchants. These fees are typically a flat rate plus a percentage of the total sale. This money is referred to as interchange income, and it is directly tied to the number and size of transactions a cardholder makes on their credit card. Interchange income represents 70% to 90% of the total fees paid to issuers by merchants;

10.10 In order to maximize credit card transaction volume (and thus interchange income), credit card companies like Capital One offer reward programs. These reward programs may create direct financial incentives (for example, “cash back”), restaurant gift cards, or airline miles to incentivize cardholders to make purchases using the issuer’s credit card, thereby increasing interchange income;

10.11 At the same time, however, rewards programs create significant risks for issuers, from the out-of-pocket costs to cover the rewards to the risks associated with increased borrowing by cardholders. As a result, credit card issuers like Capital One aggressively compete to identify and attract high-purchase-volume, low-default-risk applicants. The secret sauce in this battle for rewards-program profits is granular, detailed personal information about applicants, which enables precise risk and reward targeting by card issuers. For example, knowledge of a cardholder’s proclivity for fine dining can be used to target a rewards program that incentivizes and rewards dining out;

10.12 In 2018, Capital One’s net income from interchange fees was approximately USD\$2.8 billion<sup>3</sup>. Capital One’s 2018 annual filing with the SEC reported that the interchange fees it collected had increased for the year because of “higher purchase volume.” Capital One’s rewards program – the subject of its well-known, and extremely expensive, “What’s In Your Wallet?” national advertising campaign – exists to increase that volume. Indeed, Capital One nets its interchange fees against the cost of its rewards program, which in 2018 was \$4.4 billion<sup>4</sup>, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Capital One Financial Corporation Annual Report dated 2018, produced herein as **Exhibit R-10**;

10.13 In short, the personal information collected from card applicants is vital to every aspect of a credit card issuer’s lending business. Personal information is used to: (1) gauge risk; (2) set limits, fees, and interest; and (3) determine the type and overall level of rewards to both attract cardholders and incentivize maximum card use. And the role of personal information is non-binary: because personal information is integral to both revenue maximization and risk minimization, there is a direct, positive correlation between the amount and granularity of personal information a credit company collects and its expected profits from cardholders;

<sup>3</sup> See page 46 of Capital One’s 2018 Annual Report (Exhibit R-10).

<sup>4</sup> See page 67 of Capital One’s 2018 Annual Report (Exhibit R-10).

10.14 The more granular and accurate the information a credit card issuer is able to obtain about a borrower, the more predictable and stable its profits become. That is why credit card issuers demand highly sensitive information from applicants; it is integral to their bottom line;

10.15 Even after the credit card application process, the stream of cardholder data continues to pour in. Credit card charges allow credit card companies to predict the expected amount of rewards that they will have to pay out, the amount of interchange income they can expect, the risk of cardholder default, and even complementary products and services that can be marketed to cardholders;

10.16 Put simply, there is an important bargain at the heart of the credit card lender-borrower relationship: the card holder agrees to provide information that the card issuer needs to ensure that its business is profitable and predictable, and in return, the card issuer agrees to safeguard that sensitive customer information;

10.17 Capital One is no exception; it needs granular borrower data. In fact, one of the risk factors Capital One routinely discloses to its investors is a failure to accurately estimate its losses (Exhibit R-10):

Estimates of Inherent Losses: The credit quality of our portfolio can have a significant impact on our earnings. We allow for and reserve against credit risks based on our assessment of credit losses inherent in our loan portfolios. This process, which is critical to our financial condition and results of operations, requires complex judgments, including forecasts of economic conditions. We may underestimate our inherent losses and fail to hold an allowance for loan and lease losses sufficient to account for these losses. Incorrect assumptions could lead to material underestimations of inherent losses and inadequate allowances for loan and lease losses.<sup>5</sup>

10.18 As Capital One's Annual Report (Exhibit R-10) explains, its business depends on the ability to make judgments and forecasts about likely losses. For that, Capital One relies heavily on accurate and timely data about its customers;

10.19 Capital One had been collecting an unprecedented amount of data about its customers since 2005; this data informed Capital One of the risks of lending its credit card users, of how often its customers spent, what they spent on, and even where they went and what they cared about. Significant amounts of hardware and software infrastructure were necessary to mine this data and to succeed in "machine learning" (a process through which computer algorithms are given raw data and "learn" on their own to discern patterns and accomplish tasks). Capital One needed data centres, storage, and computation power – all with the airtight security befitting a major financial institution;

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<sup>5</sup> See page 21 of Capital One's 2018 Annual Report (Exhibit R-10).



10.20 Capital One's competitors were mining information from their customers by creating their own massive data centres, which they would upgrade, maintain, and secure at their own significant expense. Capital One had done the same for years; the cost, however, was considered by Capital One to be too high. Scaling would require more investment, and if the scaling was wrong, there was no inexpensive way to scale down;

10.21 Amazon's AWS public cloud for storage and processing of sensitive financial data presented a potential solution. AWS would allow Capital One to buy only as much computing power and storage as it needed and it allowed Capital One to leverage Amazon's data scientists and machine learning tools, as well as arrays of the graphics processing units capable of the massive simultaneous calculations needed for machine learning;

10.22 Unfortunately, there were serious problems with using AWS to mine customer data. Most importantly, the machine learning models required massive amounts of historical data and if the data was insufficient, the models would not be accurate. In other words, Capital One would need to place years (and potentially over a decade) of sensitive customer information on the AWS cloud. The potential damage from a security breach compromising a large stockpile of historical data would be incalculable;

10.23 To optimize machine learning, Capital One created massive data lakes (i.e., repositories of customer data) containing data retained far in excess of customer expectations. Capital One announced that the hacker had stolen data from credit card applications submitted as early as 2005. Capital One had held on to this data for fourteen years. To ensure that the information the algorithms gleaned was as useful as possible, Capital One also included outcomes (the customer's subsequent performance). Capital One made so much data accessible that any breach would be catastrophic;

10.24 Other large financial institutions knew this risk was too great and exercised extreme caution around customer data and elected not to place their customers' personal and private data in the hands of a public cloud provider;

10.25 While Capital One was looking for a cover for its migration, Amazon was searching for a large financial institution to adopt its AWS ecosystem. AWS's business was being adopted by technology companies, start-ups, and other unregulated or less-regulated enterprises. The prize, however, was a large financial institution—one whose adoption of AWS would signal to other apprehensive financial institutions that it was okay to make the transition to the public cloud;



(iii) AWS: The What, How and Why of it and the Respondents' Express Promises to Safeguard Sensitive Customer Data

10.26 In October 2015, when no other bank would<sup>6</sup>, Capital One announced that it would migrate its user data and applications from its own private cloud to the AWS cloud at its yearly re-Invent conference. It would move entire swaths of customer data to AWS's S3 servers to form a data lake, a single source of data that Capital One's applications and machine learning models could all draw from. That data lake included years of customer application data in order to better allow artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms to monetize that data for Capital One and Amazon. This left Capital One only as secure as its least secure division, the whole as appears more fully from copies of extracts from Respondent Amazon Web Services, Inc.'s website at <https://aws.amazon.com>, from a copy of the Forbes article entitled "How Capital One Became A Leading Digital Bank" dated December 12, 2016, from a copy of the Medium article entitled "Capital One's Cloud Journey Through the Stages of Adoption" dated April 5, 2017, and from a copy of the CIO article entitled "Real world lessons from AWS re:Invent 2015" dated October 20, 2015, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-11**;

10.27 This aggregation of sensitive consumer data had to be represented to be safe to Capital One's current and prospective customers. If customers do not believe that their information will be safe, they would never agree to apply for, or use, a Capital One credit card. Capital One, with Amazon's assistance, set out to assuage those fears by making false and/or misleading representations and omissions to current and potential customers, even developing its own software to manage the permissions of its internal computers and customer-facing applications to access the shared data lake. In other words, Capital One and Amazon represented that they were able to guard against the inherent risk of pooling massive amounts of sensitive customer data for mining on the public cloud;

10.28 By way of example, the Respondents represented the following about AWS cloud computing (Exhibit R-11):

We didn't want to be in the position of trying to convince stakeholders of the value of the cloud without being able to first assure them that we could responsibly deploy and run any of our applications there;

That meant tackling questions about security early and head on. "As a financial institution, we take the safety of our customer data incredibly seriously," says Brady. "Before we moved a single workload, we engaged groups from across the company to build a risk framework for the cloud that met the same high bar for security and compliance that we meet in our on-premises environments. AWS worked with us every step of the way."

<sup>6</sup> National Bank of Canada used AWS Cloud to help it collect and process a fast-growing volume of stock-market financial data to optimize its trading operations and generate more revenue (Exhibit R-6).

- 10.29 For years, however, AWS suffered from a widely known flaw. AWS servers, unlike those run by its competitors (e.g., Google), were not secured against a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack, which would allow an attacker to get inside a firewall and make requests to the data lake, including requests to pipe the data outside of the firewall to a third-party server;
- 10.30 To provide additional cover for its migration to the public cloud, Capital One created software, called Cloud Custodian, which it jointly showcased and marketed with Amazon. It was described as a “rules engine” that allowed Capital One to set specific policies within AWS that would apply in real time to the various servers that accessed its data lake. The software would, among other things, purportedly automatically scan Capital One’s internal systems to ensure that all of the servers and permissions were set according to defined policies. Thus, when a computer wanted to access data from the data lake, it would assume a defined “role” that would then give it access to some portion or all of the data in the data lake (Exhibit R-11), the whole as appears more fully from a copy of an extract from the Amazon Respondents’ website at <https://aws.amazon.com> entitled “Announcing Cloud Custodian Integration with AWS Security Hub” dated November 29, 2018 and from a copy of the TechCrunch article entitled “Capital One open sources Cloud Custodian AWS resource management tool” dated April 19, 2016, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-12**;
- 10.31 These Identity and Access Management (“IAM”) roles are used on AWS to allow various computers to access particular resources on a dynamic basis. A computer on Capital One’s system with an IAM role configured to allow broad access, as required to train and deploy machine learning algorithms, could potentially allow that computer to access the entire data lake, the whole as appears more fully from copies of extracts from the Amazon Respondents’ website at <https://aws.amazon.com>, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-13**;
- 10.32 Cloud Custodian would purportedly ensure that IAM roles were given the proper permissions to minimize the risk of a data security breach; in other words, Cloud Custodian would grant the minimum amount of access necessary to complete a given task (Exhibit R-13). For example, a customer-facing application such as a credit card application program would need to access systems to input the customer’s data into the appropriate tables and then receive information about whether that applicant was approved and the terms of the approval, but it would not need to access information about Capital One applicants from 2005;
- 10.33 In more lay terms, Capital One claimed that Cloud Custodian automatically encrypted all of the data that Capital One made accessible to its employees. Thus, supposedly, even if a hacker penetrated Capital One’s firewall, the hacker would still not obtain meaningful data. Unfortunately, the data was not meaningfully encrypted; rather than limiting decryption to relevant persons, Capital One



automatically decrypted data for any person with Capital One credentials. As an expert explained, Capital One's encryption was "academic at best";

10.34 The reality was that Cloud Custodian was not a solution to the serious problems posed by the mass aggregation of sensitive data and the open and dynamic access of countless servers to that data. Cloud Custodian's supposed benefit; i.e. ensuring the minimum amount of access necessary to complete a task, is at cross purposes with the goal of aggregating and mining large amounts of customer data for profit. This is because in order to train and apply machine learning and AI systems, those systems need broad and dynamic access to user data, and that data must span years to ensure the accuracy and power of the AI and machine learning models;

10.35 A version of Cloud Custodian designed to minimize risk, then, would not serve Capital One's purpose for migrating to AWS's servers in the first place, which was the monetization of its customers' data. Accordingly, Cloud Custodian could not, and did not, solve the risk presented by the massive aggregation of data for exploitation on a public cloud server;

10.36 All that stood between an attacker and Capital One's data lake was a firewall, a system designed to block unauthorized access while permitting outward communication. The firewalls on Amazon's AWS cloud that guarded web applications were known to be, and continue to be, vulnerable to an SSRF attack. Other cloud providers have implemented additional precautions to ensure that requests from outside the firewall cannot be used to command resources on the inside, but AWS did not implement such precautions and has not done so to this day;

10.37 The net effect is that once an attacker obtains access to a server or system inside an AWS firewall, such as a firewall that protects a customer-facing web application, the attacker has access to all the data available to that server or system. If the attacker obtains access to a single system that can assume a broad IAM role that permits it to access to the data lake, such as those that conduct machine learning tasks, all of that data can be transferred outside of the firewall at will;

10.38 Cloud Custodian could not prevent any of this, notwithstanding the Respondents' statements that it was the solution to risk. This was a peculiar move for Amazon in particular because promotion of Cloud Custodian made no economic sense for Amazon;

10.39 First, Amazon already had a suite of tools that would purportedly ensure the proper configuration of IAM roles and monitor data access. In fact, Amazon made money selling these tools to the users of its cloud. Nonetheless, Amazon agreed to help Capital One promote Cloud Custodian even though it competed with Amazon's own tools;



10.40 Second, Cloud Custodian was both open source and cross-platform, meaning that it could be migrated to competing cloud services, such as Microsoft's Azure or Google's GCP. Accordingly, the relationship between Capital One and Amazon was far from an ordinary business relationship between a cloud provider and one of its customers. A customer that adopted Cloud Custodian could more easily move its operations to a competing provider than one that relied on Amazon's own cloud management and security ecosystem. The only plausible reason that Amazon was willing to make that concession was to coax Capital One, a major financial institution, onto its platform, thus luring other financial institutions to join it;

10.41 Amazon also promoted Capital One's migration to AWS and the Cloud Custodian program. In late 2018, AWS hosted several web pages and videos touting its partnership with Capital One, the migration of Capital One's data to its cloud, Capital One's use of AWS to perform machine learning on its user data at scale, and Cloud Custodian as a tool to keep the data safe. None of that promotion mentioned that Capital One and AWS had not dealt with the longstanding SSRF vulnerability peculiar to AWS (Exhibits R-8, R-9, and R-10);

10.42 Simply put, the only reason for Amazon's business decision to promote a competing product was the immense value of attracting a large bank to its platform when other financial services companies refused to migrate their sensitive customer data to the public cloud. Capital One's use of AWS would demonstrate the safety of the cloud to financial services companies that sought to mine sensitive customer data. In exchange for this, Capital One would receive cover for its risky migration to the cloud, the pooling of customer data into the data lake, and the vast datamining operations it could conduct on its customers' personal and private information. Together, by developing and promoting Cloud Custodian, Capital One and Amazon gave regulators and customers a false sense of security and created precedent for other large companies to adopt the AWS public cloud, thereby enhancing AWS's cloud ecosystem;

10.43 Capital One and Amazon knew about the inherent flaw in the architecture Capital One would have to deploy in order to exploit AWS's machine learning and AI tools and hardware, including the SSRF vulnerability. Both companies nevertheless falsely and/or misleadingly touted Cloud Custodian as the solution. In 2016, Amazon and Capital One posted the open source software on Amazon's AWS website, along with detailed documentation and marketing. But as both companies marketed Cloud Custodian as the solution to the risks of the data lake approach, they knew that Cloud Custodian was no solution at all;

10.44 For example, in December 2018, Mr. Kapil Thangavelu, Capital One's developer in charge of Cloud Custodian, gave a presentation at Amazon's AWS re:Invent conference. His presentation, entitled "Cloud Custodian—Open Source Security & Governance," touted Cloud Custodian as a solution for the intractable task of maintaining appropriate permissions across several applications sharing aggregations of data. In an alarmingly prescient part of his speech, he discussed



IAM roles and the precise vulnerability with poorly secured S3 servers that would later result in a breach of Capital One's own systems. He then touted Cloud Custodian as a cure for that vulnerability, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the video entitled "AWS re:Invent 2018: Cloud Custodian – OpenSource AWS Security & Governance (DEM78)", produced herein as **Exhibit R-14**;

10.45 Capital one also claimed that it complied with principles requiring it to delete customer data after a reasonable time. Even if a hacker breached Capital One's firewall and even if the hacker somehow decrypted the data, Capital One's deletion practices would purportedly sharply limit the number of persons affected;

10.46 In addition, the Amazon Respondents claimed that "cloud security is our highest priority" and that:

"As an AWS customer using cloud computing services in the Canada Region, you will benefit from local servers and network architecture built to meet the requirement of the most security-sensitive organizations. AWS allows customers to scale and innovate, and provides the tools to maintain a protected environment. Customers can choose to secure their data locally, to help them meet Canadian PIPEDA regulations (Exhibit R-6);

10.47 Capital One represented that it had implemented a cloud risk framework and cloud governance function that would properly manage its move to the AWS Cloud, referencing its Cloud Custodian, which supposedly automated detection and correction of policy violations. It specifically referenced the following:

"As a financial institution, we take the safety of our customer data incredibly seriously," says Brady. "Before we moved a single workload, we engaged groups from across the company to build a risk framework for the cloud that met the same high bar for security and compliance that we meet in our on-premises environments. AWS worked with us every step of the way." (Exhibit R-11)

10.48 Data security is important to consumers; so important that credit card companies like Capital One make the promise of electronic safety and security a part of their card offerings. Capital One represented the following:

How we keep your information safe.

Our strong encryption technology ensures that any data that passes between your computer and our server is secure.

- We use firewall systems and intrusion detection software to prohibit unauthorized access to our systems



- Our VeriSign Secure Socket Layer Certificate means you can be extra confident that banking online with us is secure
- We automatically send you an alert informing you of any changes made to your online banking profile
- The online banking website will automatically log off after a period of inactivity during any session to protect your information.

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You're Protected

We're committed to protecting your information.

- Zero Liability protection for unauthorized use of your credit card
- 24/7 account monitoring for fraudulent activity

The whole as appears more fully from copies of extracts from the Capital One Respondents' website at www.capitalone.ca, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-15**;

10.49 Capital One's Terms and Conditions state that "Capital One supports information privacy protection", the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Capital One Customer Agreement and from a copy of the Capital one Privacy Policy, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-16**;

10.50 These statements were false and/or misleading as proven by the data theft that occurred in March 2019;

(iv) The Series of (attempted and successful) Data Thefts

10.51 On March 22 and 23, 2019, Paige Thompson, 33, a former employee of Respondent Amazon Web Services, Inc., scanned servers belonging to dozens of companies that had hosted their web applications on AWS and found a vulnerable entrypoint in Capital One's credit card application processing system. Using a server-side request forgery (SSRF) attack, Thompson tricked one of Capital One's servers into sending information from Capital One's data lake to TOR nodes outside of Capital One's firewall and then to a server that she controlled;

(a) SSRF is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to induce the server-side application to make HTTP requests to an arbitrary domain of the attacker's choosing. In typical SSRF examples, the attacker might cause the server to make a connection back to itself, or to other web-based services within the organization's infrastructure, or to external third-party systems. A successful

SSRF attack can often result in unauthorized actions or access to data within the organization, either in the vulnerable application itself or on other back-end systems that the application can communicate with, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of an extract from the Portswigger website at <https://portswigger.net> entitled “Server-side request forgery” and from a copy of the Acunetix article entitled “What is Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)?” dated February 20, 2019, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-17**;

- (b) TOR is an open-sourced software that enables for anonymous communication; the name “TOR” is derived from an acronym for the original software project name “The Onion Router”. The goal of onion routing was to have a way to use the internet with as much privacy as possible, and the idea was to route traffic through multiple servers and encrypt it each step of the way, the whole as appears more fully from copies of extracts from the TOR Project website at [www.torproject.org](http://www.torproject.org) and from a copy of the Hackernoon article entitled “How does Tor actually work?” dated March 1, 2019, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-18**;

10.52 The scope of the breach was astounding, with compromised data going back 14 years to 2005. Capital One had aggregated customer data on an unprecedented scale and the compromise of just one of the systems inside its firewall meant the complete compromise of over a decade of sensitive customer data. In other words, because Capital One had pooled all of its customer data together, unauthorized access to one necessarily implied access to all;

10.53 Not only did Cloud Custodian fail to prevent this data theft, it failed to even detect that it had happened at all; it wasn’t until a July 2019 email from a third-party that Capital One even recognized that its systems had suffered from the devastating attack. A picture of the redacted email appears below:



10.54 The email stated that there appeared to be leaked data belonging to Capital One on GitHub, and provided the address of the GitHub file containing this leaked data. After receiving this information, Capital One examined the GitHub file, which was

timestamped April 21, 2019. Capital One determined that it contained the IP address for a specific server. A firewall misconfiguration permitted commands to reach and be executed by that server, which enabled access to folders or buckets of data in Capital One's storage space on the AWS Cloud;

10.55 Capital One determined that the file contained code for three commands, as well as a list of more than 700 folders or buckets of data:

- (a) Capital One determined that the first command, when executed, obtained security credentials for an account known as \*\*\*\*\*-WAF-Role that, in turn, enabled access to certain of Capital One's folders on the AWS Cloud;
- (b) Capital One determined that the second command, when executed, used the \* \* \* \*-WAF-Role account to list the names of folders or buckets of data in Capital One's storage space on the AWS Cloud;
- (c) Capital One determined that the third command, when executed, used the \*\*\*\*\*-WAF-Role to extract or copy data from those folders or buckets in Capital One's storage space for which the \*\*\*\*\*-WAF-Role account had the requisite permissions;

10.56 According to Capital One's logs, a number of connections or attempted connections to Capital One's server from TOR exit nodes, and a number of connections from IP addresses beginning with 46.246, all of which Capital One believes relate to activity conducted by the same person involved in the April 21, 2019, intrusion because they involve similar unusual communications through the misconfigured firewall to the server discussed above. Specifically, according to Capital One, the logs show:

- (a) On or about March 12, 2019, IP address 46.246.35.99 attempted to access Capital One's data. This IP address is controlled by Ipredator, a company that provides Virtual Private Network (VPN) services;
- (b) On March 22, 2019, the \*\*\*\*\*-WAF-Role account was used to execute the List Buckets Command several times. These commands were executed from IP addresses believed to be TOR exit nodes. According to Capital One, the \*\*\*\*\*-WAF-Role account does not, in the ordinary course of business, invoke the List Buckets Command;
- (c) Also on or about March 22, 2019, the \*\*\*\*\*-WAF-Role account was used to execute the Sync Command a number of times to obtain data from certain of Capital One's data folders or buckets, including files that contain credit card application data. A number of those commands were executed from IP address 46.246.38.224. I know, from checking publicly-available records, that that IP address also is controlled by Ipredator;



(d) One of the files copied from Capital One's folders or buckets on March 22, 2019, was a file with the name \*\*\*\*c000.snappy.parquet and this was the only time the \*\*\*\*-WAF-Role account accessed the Snappy Parquet File between January 1, 2019 and July 20, 2019;

(e) A List Buckets Command was executed on April 21, 2019, from IP address 46.246.35.103. The IP address from which this command was executed also is controlled by Ipredator. Based on the timestamp on the April 21, 2019 file, and the time that Capital One reports that the command appears in Capital One's logs, that this was the command that was the source of the April 21 file;

10.57 It was clear that Cloud Custodian was either a facade, designed to lull customers and regulators into a false sense of security or it was never properly configured to limit access to years of historical data and it was not programmed to detect anomalies. Either way, all of Capital One and Amazon's statements about Cloud Custodian were revealed to have been false and/or misleading;

10.58 Because the fact of the data theft itself and any investigations related thereto threatened to expose a more existential problem with Capital One's cloud operations, the Respondents continued to downplay the root cause to the public. Both Capital One and Amazon blamed a misconfigured firewall for the data theft, but that assertion is inaccurate. The problem is inherent in the architecture that Capital One chose and AWS enabled. Neither company addressed the fact that the architecture employed by Capital One on AWS was and is inherently at risk of a widespread data security breach, including from an SSRF attack. Nor did either company address that, by design, Cloud Custodian, their touted solution to data vulnerability, was unable to detect or stop the attack;

10.59 Instead, Capital One and Amazon appear content to take no action to correct the issues. Amazon has not fixed its systemic vulnerability to the particular form of attack used in the data theft. Capital One has not fixed its aggregation-based, data-lake architecture that allows a simple hack to have devastating consequences. Both companies continue to profit on risking customers' valuable personal information;

10.60 Further, it was only on July 29, 2019 that Capital one announced that Class Members' personal and private information had been hacked – approximately four months after the incident;

10.61 The admissions in Capital One's announcement (Exhibit R-1), subsequent reporting, and reports from former employees show that Capital One had sacrificed cybersecurity to a dangerous extent, contrary to their repeated claims. Given Capital One's deficient cybersecurity measures, the data theft was inevitable;

10.62 On July 29, 2019, Paige Thompson, also known by the alias "erratic", was arrested and on August 28, 2019, she was indicted by a grand jury in the United



States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle for wire fraud and computer fraud and abuse, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Complaint for Violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1030 (a)(2) dated July 29, 2019, from a copy of the Indictment dated August 28, 2019, from a copy of the Wired article entitled “The Alleged Capital one hacker Didn’t Cover Her Tracks” dated July 29, 2019, and from a copy of the Wired article entitled “Everything We Know About the Capital One Hacking Case So Far” dated August 28, 2019, produced herein *en liasse* as **Exhibit R-19**;

10.63 On July 31, 2019, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) opened an investigation into the data breach at Capital One after receiving complaints from Canadian customers, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the OPC announcement entitled “OPC launches investigation into Capital One breach” dated July 31, 2019, produced herein as **Exhibit R-20**;

10.64 Capital One, with AWS’s knowing assistance, falsely and/or misleadingly represented that it would use industry-standard practices to protect its customers’ personal information. They falsely and/or misleadingly represented the capability of Cloud Custodian. They downplayed the data theft. And they are continuing to falsely and or misleadingly represented the security (or lack thereof) of the personal information in the data lake;

10.65 If Class Members knew the truth, they would not have paid interest and fees to Capital One, and they would not have applied for a Capital One credit card;

(v) *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 (PIPEDA)*

10.66 The Respondents’ data security practices run contrary to PIPEDA and even more inexcusably given the real risk of significant harm that a security breach entails where the personal and private information is highly sensitive and has been or will be misused;

10.67 PIPEDA does not define sensitivity; however, the concept of sensitivity of personal information is discussed in Principle 4.3.4 of PIPEDA which states:

Although some information (for example, medical records and income records) is almost always considered to be sensitive, any information can be sensitive, depending on the context. For example, the names and addresses of subscribers to a newsmagazine would generally not be considered sensitive information. However, the names and addresses of subscribers to some special-interest magazines might be considered sensitive.

10.68 Suffice it to say that Class Members’ social insurance numbers, names, addresses, zip codes/postal codes, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of



birth, self-reported income, credit card application data, credit card customer data, including, customer status data, e.g., credit scores, credit limits, balances, payment history, contact information, and transaction data, which could be used by a criminal to assume their identities would be considered highly-sensitive data. The more sensitive the data is, the higher level of protection an organization must employ (PIPEDA, Principle 4.7.2);

10.69 In addition, there was a high probability of misuse of Class Members' personal and private information and that Class Members would be harmed;

10.70 The Respondents should have established adequate security safeguards to prevent and detect unauthorized access to personal and private information;

10.71 Capital One's loose access policies, huge numbers of vast data lakes, and automatic decryption made a hack like the data theft inevitable. With too many authorized requests by Capital One employees and algorithms to access data to monitor, an illegitimate request would be difficult to catch. Indeed, the hacker involved in the data theft accessed Capital One's data three times in March and April 2019 and used Capital One's computer resources to mine bitcoin, without ever being detected;

10.72 The final weakness in Capital One's cybersecurity defences was the Respondents themselves. In 2017, Capital One hired Michael Johnson to be its Chief Information Security Officer ("CISO"), the head of the cybersecurity division. The Respondents considered turnover in that division material and closely monitored it, including in reports to Capital One's board of directors. Johnson immediately alienated the cybersecurity division's employees. The division's turnover in 2018 was about one third. Under Johnson, Capital One's cybersecurity division even omitted to take elementary precautions like installing security software Capital One had purchased;

10.73 The July 29, 2019 announcement of the data theft thus was the inevitable result of Capital One's abandoning cybersecurity practices to carry further its business plan;

(vi) The U.S. Litigation

10.74 On or about July 31, 2019, the first U.S. class action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in Civil Action No. 19-2292 dated July 31, 2019, produced herein as **Exhibit R-21**;

10.75 By October 2, 2019, there were 21 actions pending in 12 districts and 40 potentially-related actions filed in 13 districts. On October 2, 2019, 17 civil actions were centralized in a multi-district litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the



Transfer Order in MDL No. 2915 dated October 2, 2019, produced herein as **Exhibit R-22**;

10.76 Also on October 2, 2019, a securities class action was filed and on November 20, 2019, a Conditional Transfer Order was issued by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation upon finding that the securities class action involved questions of fact that are common to actions previously transferred, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws in *Minsky v. Capital One Financial Corporation, et al.*, Case No. 1:19-cv-1472 and from a copy of the Conditional Transfer Order (CTO-2) for MDL No. 2915 dated November 20, 2019, produced herein *en l'asse* as **Exhibit R-23**;

10.77 A copy of the list of all associated cases in MDL 2915 as well as a copy of the most recently filed class action *In Re: Capital One Customer Data Security Breach Litigation* dated November 15, 2019, are produced herein *en l'asse* as **Exhibit R-24**;

10.78 On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel was appointed, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of Pretrial Order #3 dated December 2, 2019, produced herein as **Exhibit R-25**;

10.79 On December 10, 2019, an initial status conference was reset for January 29, 2020, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Amended Pretrial Order #4, dated December 10, 2019, produced herein as **Exhibit R-26**;

10.80 On January 17, 2020, an Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws was filed in the record, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of the Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws dated January 17, 2020, produced herein as **Exhibit R-27**;

(vii) Summative Remarks

10.81 Without the assurance that Capital One would safeguard their sensitive personal and private information, Class Members would not have agreed to provide this information to Capital One. Potential customers would not apply for, let alone use and pay for (through interest, fees, and foregone rewards from other issuers), a card from an issuer that did not protect the sensitive information provided by the customer. This in turn would significantly harm, even decimate, Capital One's credit card profits. Indeed, Capital One warned of precisely this risk in its 2018 annual report (Exhibit R-10):

Our ability to originate and maintain accounts is highly dependent upon the perceptions of consumer and commercial borrowers and deposit holders and other external perceptions of our business and compliance practices or our financial health. In addition, our brand has historically



been, and we expect it to continue to be, very important to us. Maintaining and enhancing our brand will depend largely on our ability to continue to provide high-quality products and services. Adverse perceptions regarding our reputation in the consumer, commercial and funding markets could lead to difficulties in generating and maintaining accounts as well as in financing them. In particular, negative public perceptions regarding our reputation could lead to decreases in the levels of deposits that consumer and commercial customers and potential customers choose to maintain with us or significantly increase the costs of attracting and retaining customers. In addition, negative perceptions regarding certain industries, partners or clients could also prompt us to cease business activities associated with those entities.

Negative public opinion or damage to our brand could also result from actual or alleged conduct in any number of activities or circumstances, including lending practices, regulatory compliance, security breaches (including the use and protection of customer information), corporate governance and sales and marketing, and from actions taken by regulators or other persons in response to such conduct. Such conduct could fall short of our customers' and the public's heightened expectations of companies of our size with rigorous data, privacy and compliance practices, and could further harm our reputation. In addition, our cobrand and private label partners or other third parties with whom we have important relationships may take actions over which we have limited control that could negatively impact perceptions about us or the financial services industry. The proliferation of social media may increase the likelihood that negative public opinion from any of the events discussed above will impact our reputation and business.<sup>7</sup>

10.82 In a saturated market for credit cards, credit card companies fiercely compete for borrowers with good credit history. A sine qua non of this competitive process is the promise to electronically protect an applicant's most sensitive personal and private information using (at a minimum) industry-standard data security practices. As detailed in this application, this is a promise that Capital One made repeatedly – and continues to make – to credit card applicants and cardholders, in numerous places and contexts, to obtain the valuable personal data that drives its bottom line. It is a promise bolstered by Amazon. And it is a promise that was and is knowingly false and/or misleading;

## **VII. FACTS GIVING RISE TO INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BY THE PETITIONERS**

### **(i) Petitioner Royer**

11. Petitioner Royer is a Costco Capital One Credit Card holder, which he applied for (and was accepted) approximately 4-5 years ago (i.e. in 2015). In order to fill out

<sup>7</sup> See page 30 of Capital One's 2018 Annual Report (Exhibit R-10).

the application form, he was required to furnish his personal, private, and sensitive information, including his SIN number;

12. It is safe to say that his personal and private information has been compromised;

13. Petitioner Royer had every reason to believe, and did indeed believe, that the Respondents would safeguard his personal and private information from any unauthorized access – they failed in this duty;

13.1 On August 14, 2019, Petitioner Royer received an email from Capital One informing him of the data theft and specifying the following:

“Based on our investigation, we believe your personal information may have been obtained as part of this incident. We’re deeply sorry for the understandable worry this has caused and are committed to making this right.

...  
Personal information impacted.

Our investigation has determined that the person responsible may have gained access to the following information:

- Personal information routinely collected at the time we receive credit applications, including name, address, postal code, phone number, email address, date of birth and self-reported income.
- Customer status data, including credit score, credit limit, account balance, payment history and contact information.
- Fragments of customer transaction data from a total of 23 days during 2016, 2017 and 2018.”

The whole as appears more fully from a copy of the email from Capital One to Petitioner Royer with the subject “Michael, important information about a recent cybersecurity incident” dated August 14, 2019, produced herein as **Exhibit R-27**;

14. Petitioner Royer’s damages are a direct and proximate result of the Respondents’ conduct;

15. In consequence of the foregoing, Petitioner Royer is justified in claiming damages;

(ii) Petitioner Abou-Khadra

15.1 Petitioner Abou-Khadra is a Costco Capital One Credit Card holder, which he applied for (and was accepted) in 2015. In order to fill out the application form, he

was required to furnish his personal, private, and sensitive information, including his SIN number;

15.2 On July 30, 2019, in watching the news, Petitioner Abou-Khadra learned that Capital One credit card holders' personal and private information had been compromised by a data theft;

15.3 As a result and, also on July 30, 2019, Petitioner Abou-Khadra checked his online credit card statement and he found two suspicious transactions on his Capital One credit card; one for \$267.00 to PowerKeto and the other for \$2.55 also to PowerKeto<sup>8</sup>, the whole as appears more fully from copies of three screenshots of Petitioner Abou-Khadra's listed credit card transactions, produced herein *en l'asse* as **Exhibit R-28**;

15.4 Petitioner Abou-Khadra called Capital One to report the suspicious transactions. After a long wait, he was able to get transferred to the fraud department, who told him that they would investigate the matter;

15.5 Petitioner Abou-Khadra had to follow up with Capital One as the charges were not reversed for two credit card cycles and at that point, the charges were reversed after it was confirmed that his account had in fact been compromised;

15.6 As a result of this, Petitioner Abou-Khadra had to cancel his Capital One credit card and request a replacement;

15.7 Petitioner Abou-Khadra had every reason to believe, and did indeed believe, that the Respondents would safeguard his personal and private information from any unauthorized access – they failed in this duty;

15.8 Petitioner Abou-Khadra's damages are a direct and proximate result of the Respondents' conduct;

15.9 In consequence of the foregoing, Petitioner Abou-Khadra is justified in claiming damages;

#### **VIII. FACTS GIVING RISE TO INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BY EACH MEMBER OF THE CLASS**

16. Every member of the Class is a holder of a Capital One Credit Card and has or will suffer the damages as alleged in paragraph 6 above;

17. All of these damages to the Class Members are a direct and proximate result of the Respondents' conduct;

<sup>8</sup> According to PowerKeto's website at <https://powerketodiet.net>, PowerKeto Diet Pills are a dietary supplement you can take for helping aid in weight loss.

## **IX. CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO INSTITUTE A CLASS ACTION**

A) The composition of the Class makes it difficult or impractical to apply the rules for mandates to sue on behalf of others or for consolidation of proceedings

18. Petitioners are unaware of the specific number of persons who have a Capital One Credit Card, but the Respondents have admitted that approximately 6 million Canadian customers were affected by the data reach and 1 million Canadian SIN numbers were compromised;

19. Class Members are numerous and are scattered across the entire province;

20. In addition, given the costs and risks inherent in an action before the courts, many people will hesitate to institute an individual action against the Respondents. Even if Class Members themselves could afford such individual litigation, it would place an unjustifiable and enormous burden on the courts (...) and, at the very least, is not in the interests of judicial economy. Further, individual litigation of the factual and legal issues raised by the conduct of the Respondents would increase delay and expense to all parties and to the court system;

20.1 This class action overcomes the dilemma inherent in an individual action whereby the legal fees alone would deter recovery and thereby in empowering the consumer, it realizes both individual and social justice as well as rectifies the imbalance and restore the parties to parity;

21. Also, a multitude of actions instituted in different (...) territorial and judicial districts, risks having contradictory judgments on issues of fact and law that are similar or related to all members of the Class;

22. These facts demonstrate that it would be impractical, if not impossible, to contact each and every member of the Class to obtain mandates and to join them in one action;

23. In these circumstances, a class action is the only appropriate procedure and the only viable means for all of the members of the Class to effectively pursue their respective rights and have access to justice;

B) The claims of the members of the Class raise identical, similar or related issues of law or fact

24. Individual issues, if any, pale by comparison to the numerous common issues that will advance the litigation significantly;

25. The damages sustained by the Class Members flow, in each instance, from a common nucleus of operative facts, namely, the Respondents' misconduct;



26. The claims of the Class Members raise identical, similar or related issues of fact or law, namely:

- a) Did the Defendants provide false and/or misleading information to Class Members with the goal of receiving and/or retaining their personal and private information?
- b) Did the Defendants falsely and/or misleadingly claim that Cloud Custodian would detect and prevent misconfigured Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and policy-based permissions?
- c) Did the Defendants know or should they have known about AWS's Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability?
- d) Did the Defendants know or should they have known that their web application firewall was vulnerable to attack, including by an SSRF?
- e) Did the Defendants knowingly or recklessly make false and/or misleading statements and/or omissions about the security of Capital One's customer data on the AWS cloud?
- f) Did the Defendants knowingly or recklessly make false and/or misleading statements about the use of customer data on the AWS cloud and the breadth of data that would be stored there?
- g) Were the Defendants negligent in the safekeeping of Class Members' personal and private information, which were compromised on or about March 22 and 23, 2019?
- h) Did the Defendants employ adequate data protection policies and security safeguards for Class Members' personal and private information?
- i) Did the Defendants fail to comply with internal company policies and applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards relating to data security?
- j) Should the Defendants have discovered the data theft prior to the external security researcher's report email to the company on July 17, 2019?
- k) Did the Defendants timely disclose the data breach to Class Members on July 29, 2019?
- l) Are the Defendants responsible for all related damages, including, but not limited to monetary losses, trouble and inconvenience, moral damages, additional credit monitoring, lost time, lost value of their personal and private information, and in what amount?



m) Should an injunctive remedy be ordered to force the Defendants to establish adequate data protections and security safeguards to prevent and detect unauthorized access to personal and private information?

n) Are the Defendants responsible to pay punitive damages to Class Members and in what amount?

27. The interests of justice favour that this application be granted in accordance with its conclusions;

#### **X. NATURE OF THE ACTION AND CONCLUSIONS SOUGHT**

28. The action that the Petitioners wish to institute on behalf of the members of the Class is an action in damages and injunctive relief;

29. The conclusions that the Petitioners wish to introduce by way of an application to institute proceedings are:

GRANT the class action of the Plaintiffs and each of the members of the Class;

ORDER the Defendants to establish adequate data protections and security safeguards to prevent and detect unauthorized access to personal and private information;

DECLARE the Defendants solidarily liable for the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs and each of the members of the Class;

CONDEMN the Defendants to pay to each member of the Class a sum to be determined in compensation of the damages suffered, and ORDER collective recovery of these sums;

CONDEMN the Defendants to pay to each of the members of the Class, punitive damages, and ORDER collective recovery of these sums;

CONDEMN the Defendants to pay interest and additional indemnity on the above sums according to law from the date of service of the application to authorize a class action;

ORDER the Defendants to deposit in the office of this court the totality of the sums which forms part of the collective recovery, with interest and costs;

ORDER that the claims of individual Class Members be the object of collective liquidation if the proof permits and alternately, by individual liquidation;

CONDEMN the Defendants to bear the costs of the present action including expert and notice fees;



RENDER any other order that this Honourable Court shall determine and that is in the interest of the members of the Class;

A) Petitioners request that they be attributed the status of representatives of the Class

30. The Petitioners are members of the Class;

31. The Petitioners are ready and available to manage and direct the present action in the interest of the members of the Class that he wishes to represent and is determined to lead the present file to a final resolution of the matter, the whole for the benefit of the Class, as well as, to dedicate the time necessary for the present action before the Courts and the *Fonds d'aide aux actions collectives*, as the case may be, and to collaborate with his attorneys;

32. The Petitioners have the capacity and interest to fairly and properly protect and represent the interest of the members of the Class;

33. The Petitioners have given the mandate to their attorneys to obtain all relevant information with respect to the present action and intend to keep informed of all developments;

34. The Petitioners , with the assistance of their attorneys, are ready and available to dedicate the time necessary for this action and to collaborate with other members of the Class and to keep them informed;

35. The Petitioners have given instructions to their attorneys to put information about this class action on its website and to collect the coordinates of those Class Members that wish to be kept informed and participate in any resolution of the present matter, the whole as will be shown at the hearing. To date, 7532 potential Class Members who have inputted their information through the CLG webpage, the whole as appears more fully from a copy of a redacted chart, produced herein as Exhibit R-30;

36. The Petitioners are in good faith and have instituted this action for the sole goal of having their rights, as well as the rights of other Class Members, recognized and protected so that they may be compensated for the damages that they have suffered as a consequence of the Respondents' conduct;

37. The Petitioners understand the nature of the action;

38. The Petitioners' interests are not antagonistic to those of other members of the Class;



39. The Petitioners are prepared to be examined out-of-court on their allegations (as may be authorized by the Court) and to be present for Court hearings, as may be required and necessary;
40. The Petitioners have spent time researching this issue on the internet and meeting with their attorneys to prepare this file. In so doing, they are convinced that the problem is widespread;
41. (...)
- B) Petitioners suggest that this class action be exercised before the Superior Court of justice in the district of Montreal
42. A great number of the members of the Class reside in the judicial district of Montreal and in the appeal district of Montreal;
43. The Petitioners' attorneys practice their profession in the judicial district of Montreal;
44. The present application is well founded in fact and in law.

**FOR THESE REASONS, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:**

**GRANT** the present application;

**AUTHORIZE** the bringing of a class action in the form of an application to institute proceedings in damages and injunctive relief;

**APPOINT** the Petitioners as representatives of the persons included in the class herein described as:

- all persons, entities, or organizations resident in Quebec who were either Capital One Credit Card holders or who had applied for a Capital One Credit Card and whose personal and private information was compromised by the incident that occurred on or about March 22 and 23, 2019 (though such breach was only disclosed to the public on July 29, 2019), or any other group to be determined by the Court;

**IDENTIFY** the principle issues of fact and law to be treated collectively as the following:

- Did the Defendants provide false and/or misleading information to Class Members with the goal of receiving and/or retaining their personal and private information?
- Did the Defendants falsely and/or misleadingly claim that Cloud Custodian would detect and prevent misconfigured Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and policy-based permissions?



- c) Did the Defendants know or should they have known about AWS's Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability?
- d) Did the Defendants know or should they have known that their web application firewall was vulnerable to attack, including by an SSRF?
- e) Did the Defendants knowingly or recklessly make false and/or misleading statements and/or omissions about the security of Capital One's customer data on the AWS cloud?
- f) Did the Defendants knowingly or recklessly make false and/or misleading statements about the use of customer data on the AWS cloud and the breadth of data that would be stored there?
- g) Were the Defendants negligent in the safekeeping of Class Members' personal and private information, which were compromised on or about March 22 and 23, 2019?
- h) Did the Defendants employ adequate data protection policies and security safeguards for Class Members' personal and private information?
- i) Did the Defendants fail to comply with internal company policies and applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards relating to data security?
- j) Should the Defendants have discovered the data theft prior to the external security researcher's report email to the company on July 17, 2019?
- k) Did the Defendants timely disclose the data breach to Class Members on July 29, 2019?
- l) Are the Defendants responsible for all related damages, including, but not limited to monetary losses, trouble and inconvenience, moral damages, additional credit monitoring, lost time, lost value of their personal and private information, and in what amount?
- m) Should an injunctive remedy be ordered to force the Defendants to establish adequate data protections and security safeguards to prevent and detect unauthorized access to personal and private information?
- n) Are the Defendants responsible to pay punitive damages to Class Members and in what amount?

**IDENTIFY** the conclusions sought by the class action to be instituted as being the following:



GRANT the class action of the Plaintiffs and each of the members of the Class;

ORDER the Defendants to establish adequate security safeguards to prevent and detect unauthorized access to personal and private information;

DECLARE the Defendants solidarily liable for the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs and each of the members of the class;

CONDEMN the Defendants to pay to each member of the Class a sum to be determined in compensation of the damages suffered, and ORDER collective recovery of these sums;

CONDEMN the Defendants to pay to each of the members of the Class, punitive damages, and ORDER collective recovery of these sums;

CONDEMN the Defendants to pay interest and additional indemnity on the above sums according to law from the date of service of the motion to authorize a class action;

ORDER the Defendants to deposit in the office of this court the totality of the sums which forms part of the collective recovery, with interest and costs;

ORDER that the claims of individual Class Members be the object of collective liquidation if the proof permits and alternately, by individual liquidation;

CONDEMN the Defendants to bear the costs of the present action including expert and notice fees;

RENDER any other order that this Honourable Court shall determine and that is in the interest of the members of the Class;

**DECLARE** that all members of the Class that have not requested their exclusion, be bound by any judgment to be rendered on the class action to be instituted in the manner provided for by the law;

**FIX** the delay of exclusion at thirty (30) days from the date of the publication of the notice to the members, date upon which the members of the Class that have not exercised their means of exclusion will be bound by any judgment to be rendered herein;

**ORDER** the publication of a notice to the members of the group in accordance with article 579 C.C.P. within sixty (60) days from the judgment to be rendered herein in The Montreal Gazette and *La Presse*;

**ORDER** that said notice be available on the Respondents' websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts with a link stating "Notice to Capital One Credit Card Holders";

**ORDER** that said notice be sent by individual letters emailed and/or mailed to Class Members by using the Respondents' customer list;

**RENDER** any other order that this Honourable Court shall determine and that is in the interest of the members of the Class;

**THE WHOLE** with costs, including all publication and dissemination fees.

Montreal, January 29, 2020

(S) Jeff Orenstein

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CONSUMER LAW GROUP INC.

Per: Me Jeff Orenstein

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